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RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY BASED UPON NAKED STATISTICS RATHER THAN
REAL EVIDENCE
DANIEL J. PYLMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Before a plaintiff can recover under traditional principles of negli-
gence, she must prove a specific negligent act or omission by the defendant
that caused actual harm to the plaintiff's person or property.' Courts do not
presume negligence. 2 In the seminal case of Byrne v. Boadle, however, the
English courts first took account of the fact that there may be instances
where the plaintiff is unable to present any evidence of a specific negligent
act or omission and yet where the injury to the plaintiff and the surrounding
circumstances point to the reality that the defendant did in fact negligently
cause the injury.3 In other words, on certain occasions res ipsa loquitur (the
event "speaks for itself').4 In these situations, courts have determined that
injured plaintiffs should not be without a remedy, but rather that the mere
description of the event will serve as sufficient evidence of the defendant's
causal negligence. 5 Although courts have differed as to whether the doc-
trine creates a rebuttable presumption or merely allows the trier of fact to
draw an inference of negligence, the very existence of the doctrine provides
plaintiffs with an opportunity to recover without having to prove specific
negligent conduct by the defendant. 6
* The author is an alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009, and is currently employed
by the law firm of Cassiday Schade LLP in Chicago, Illinois. He offers his sincere thanks to Richard
W. Wright for his invaluable help and insight, his dedicated revision of many drafts, and his friendship.
And, of course, to Leigh Pylman-for her support and patience.
1. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 154, at 370 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON et al, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 39, at 242 (5th ed. 1984); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 42, at 199 (2d ed. 1955).
2. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 154, at 370.
3. Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (Exch. 1863).
4. Id
5. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 154, at 370.
6. Brown v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 843 P.2d 624, 627 (Cal. 1993) (holding that res ipsa
loquitur creates a presumption of negligence); Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 688-89 (Cal. 1944);
Anderson v. Serv. Merch. Co., Inc., 485 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Neb. 1992) (stating that if the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applies, "an inference of negligence exists for submission to the fact finders, which may
accept or reject the inference in the factual determination whether the defendant is negligent."); Mobil
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The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has received overwhelming support
in the American court system. 7 Over the years, however, American courts
have struggled to properly formulate the doctrine so as to achieve its im-
portant purpose of allowing recovery in appropriate situations while not
formulating it so broadly as to enable recovery where there is no evidence
that the defendant acted negligently. 8 More specifically, courts have found
it difficult to formulate the doctrine to allow recovery where an injury and
its circumstances point to negligent causation by the defendant, while not
expanding the doctrine so far as to enable plaintiffs to recover when the
circumstances of the particular accident fail to indicate in any way that (1)
negligent conduct was the cause of the plaintiffs injury and (2) the negli-
gent causal conduct was that of the defendant.9 Indeed, some articulations
of res ipsa loquitur transform the doctrine into a mere statistical probability
test, so that if the doctrine were applied literally, plaintiffs could raise a
prima facie case of negligent causation by the defendant based upon naked
statistical data alone rather than upon any concrete evidence of negligent
conduct by anyone, much less by the defendant, in the particular situa-
tion.10 The drafters of these formulations have at times lost sight of the fact
that, when applying res ipsa, there must be some substantive reason for
holding a particular defendant liable. 1 ' Conversely, other formulations of
the doctrine are overly strict, thereby undercutting the policy reasons for
which the doctrine exists and disabling plaintiffs from recovering where a
legitimate claim exists. 12
The various formulations of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine found in the
case law as well as in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereafter Res-
Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Tex. 1974) (stating that the effect of res ipsa loquitur is that
the jury may infer negligence, but that no presumption of negligence arises); Owen v. Brown, 447
S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex. 1969).
7. KEETON, supra note 1, § 39, at 244 (claiming that all state courts have explicitly accepted and
applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur except for South Carolina, which has rejected it by name but
applied it in effect). See, e.g., Culp v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 846, 4-5 (4th Cir.
1998) (stating that South Carolina has unequivocally rejected the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur). But see
Debusscher v. Sam's East, Inc., 505 F.3d 475, 480-81 (6th Cir. 2007) (indicating that Michigan courts
have been reluctant to accept the res ipsa loquitur doctrine explicitly, though they have implicitly and
effectively adopted a form of the doctrine).
8. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 1, § 39, at 243-44; Foster v. City of Keyser, 501 S.E.2d 165,
179-83 (W. Va. 1997); Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 327 A.2d 94, 96-99 (Pa. 1974).
9. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 154, at 371.
10. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 17 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) [hereafter RESTATEMENT THIRD].
I. Id. at cmts. b & d (suggesting that a mere statistical probability that the defendant negligently
caused the injury, without any case-specific evidence that this is true, would be sufficient to raise a
prima facie case under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur).
12. See, e.g., Debusscher, 505 F.3d at 480-81 (listing several limiting instructions accompanying
the core role of res ipsa loquitur that undercut the efficacy and purpose of the doctrine).
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tatement Second) and the Restatement (Third) of Torts (hereafter Restate-
ment Third) illustrate the difficulty of formulating the doctrine appropriate-
ly. 13 In this note, I argue that the Restatement Second successfully balanced
the policy concerns underlying res ipsa loquitur with the real-life consider-
ation that a plaintiff, although she may have suffered serious injuries, ought
not be able to invoke the doctrine unless she has sufficiently implicated the
relevant defendant as the party responsible for her injuries. 14 I then take a
critical look at the Restatement Third which has transformed the doctrine of
res ipsa into a pure statistical probability test by eliminating portions of the
doctrine that served as necessary safeguards for preventing liability where
there is no particularistic evidence linking the defendant to the injury. 15
In Part I of this note, I discuss the development of res ipsa loquitur.
More particularly, I examine the changes in the doctrine that have increa-
singly allowed for recovery based upon abstract probabilistic data and the
implications of these changes for the common assertion that allowing re-
covery under res ipsa can simply be equated with proving negligence via
circumstantial evidence. 16 In Part II, I discuss whether abstract statistics
should be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of res ipsa loquitur.'7 Part
III will consist of an argument for the formulation of res ipsa found in the
Restatement Second.18 Finally, in Part IV, I critically examine the formula-
tion of res ipsa loquitur found in the Restatement Third and the rationale
for the changes made from the Restatement Second.19 I explain why those
changes are misguided, unhelpful, and, if literally applied, will lead to the
liability of defendants who have not negligently caused an injury while also
preventing the liability of defendants who have.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965) [hereafter RESTATEMENT SECOND];
RESTATEMENT THIRD § 17.
14. Infra at Part III (arguing that the Restatement Second offers the best formulation of res ipsa
loquitur insofar as it serves the purpose for which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur exists-namely,
serving injured plaintiffs who, due to the nature of the injury-causing accident, are unable to offer
specific evidence of negligent causation by the defendant-while also requiring the plaintiff to present
some case-specific evidence, direct or circumstantial, indicating she has identified the defendant re-
sponsible for her injuries).
15. Infra at Part IV (arguing that the drafters of the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur in the Restatement
Third have transformed the doctrine into one that, if literally applied, can be satisfied with purely
statistical data).
16. Infra at Part I (tracing the changes in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur that have opened the
door to the possibility of recovery through presentation of statistical data).
17. Infra at Part It (discussing the assumptions that have resulted in the conclusion that plaintiffs
should be able to recover, in certain situations and under certain theories, based upon statistical data
rather than case-specific evidence).
18. Infra at Part 11I.
19. Infra at Part IV.
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I. FROM CONCRETE EVIDENCE TO ABSTRACT STATISTICS
It has often been said that "res ipsa loquitur" is merely a fanciful
name for ordinary proof of negligence through circumstantial evidence. 20
Prosser, in his Handbook of the Law of Torts, referred to res ipsa loquitur
as "one type of circumstantial evidence" and wrote that the doctrine con-
sists of "nothing more than a reasonable conclusion, from the circums-
tances of an unusual accident, that it was probably the defendant's fault. '21
This understanding of res ipsa loquitur may appear correct given the way
the doctrine was applied in its earliest cases, such as Byrne v. Boadle.22
There, the plaintiff was a pedestrian passing by the defendant's warehouse
when a barrel of flour rolled out of an overhead window and landed on the
plaintiff, causing him serious injuries. 23 The only evidence adduced by the
plaintiff at trial was the testimony of a passing witness who saw nothing
but the barrel strike the plaintiff and knock him into an adjoining shop; the
plaintiff himself had no recollection of what had taken place.24 Despite the
plaintiffs inability to offer "a scintilla of evidence" of any specific negli-
gent act or omission by the defendant or its employees, the court held that
the injury and its immediately surrounding circumstances established a
prima facie case of negligence against the defendant.25 This was true be-
cause, as Baron Pollack famously noted, a "barrel could not roll out of a
warehouse without some negligence."'26
Looking at the facts of Byrne v. Boadle, one may be tempted to agree
with those who label res ipsa loquitur as merely a fancy-sounding name for
ordinary proof of negligence and causation through circumstantial evi-
dence. After all, as Baron Pollack stated, this type of injury would not oc-
cur without negligence by someone, and the only plausible sources of such
causal negligence in that case were persons under the control of the defen-
dant. Yet the case law suggests that courts have applied res ipsa loquitur in
various cases that would be described as anything but ordinary circumstan-
20. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 154, at 372; KEETON, supra note 1, § 39, at 242-43; Aguirre v. Turner
Constr. Co., 501 F.3d 825, 831 (7th Cir. 2007); Debusscher v. Sam's East, Inc., 505 F.3d 475, 480 (6th
Cir. 2007); Estate of Zimmerman v. SEPTA, 17 F. Supp. 2d 372, 379 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Seeley v.
Combs, 416 P.2d 810, 813 (Cal. 1966); Haas v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 755, 761 (Mass. 1980).
21. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 42, at 201.
22. Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 301. Appearances can be deceiving, however. As I will discuss infra,
Prosser's formulation of res ipsa loquitur is not the same doctrine that the Baron Pollock applied in
Byrne. Id.; see infra at notes 28 & accompanying text, 39-40 & accompanying text.
23. Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 299.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 300-01.
26. d. at 301.
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tial evidence cases. 27 Indeed, even in Byrne v. Boadle the inference of neg-
ligent conduct was not based upon the traditional understanding of cir-
cumstantial evidence. 28
A. Res Ipsa # Circumstantial Evidence
In ordinary, non-res ipsa cases, evidence, whether circumstantial or
direct, must point to the specifics of the defendant's conduct. 29 For exam-
ple, evidence such as a defendant's running from a dead body, the victim's
blood on the defendant's clothing, and the defendant's possession of the
type of weapon that was involved in the crime all serve as circumstantial
evidence that the defendant murdered the victim with that weapon. 30 Simi-
larly, in a negligence action, long skid marks left on the road by the defen-
dant's vehicle serve as circumstantial evidence that the defendant was
traveling at a high rate of speed.31 In these cases, in the absence of or in
addition to direct evidence, the plaintiff utilizes circumstantial evidence to
prove that the defendant engaged in particular, specific acts. 32
Conversely, in many cases involving the application of res ipsa loqui-
tur, the jury is permitted to infer negligent conduct by a defendant without
any evidence, direct or circumstantial, regarding the defendant's specific
conduct on the particular occasion.33 Again consider Byrne v. Boadle.34
27. See, e.g., McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 774, 776-79 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying
res ipsa loquitur where a grenade exploded despite plaintiff's inability to offer any evidence of a specif-
ic negligent act or omission by the defendants); Fowler v. Seaton, 394 P.2d 697, 698-700 (Cal. 1964)
(applying res ipsa loquitur where a three year old child suffered a serious brain injury at day care but
where the parents were unable to present any specific evidence of causal negligence by the defendant);
Anderson v. Serv. Merch. Co., Inc., 485 N.W.2d 170, 172-73 (Neb. 1992) (applying res ipsa loquitur
where a light fixture fell from the ceiling injuring the plaintiff despite the plaintiff's inability to offer
any specific evidence of a negligent act or omission by the defendant).
28. Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 300 (no circumstantial evidence, as one would traditionally define it,
was offered by the plaintiff to prove specific acts or omissions on the part of the defendant that
amounted to negligent conduct).
29. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 154, at 372.
30. These pieces of evidence would each be properly considered "circumstantial evidence" insofar
as each one of them, if taken as true, would still require an inference to be drawn in order to resolve the
ultimate issue. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 308 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006); see
also STEVEN 1. FRIEDLAND, PAUL BERGMAN & ANDREW E. TASLITZ, EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 1.06, at 6 (2d ed. 2004).
31. KEETON, supra note 1, § 39, at 242.
32. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 154, at 372; FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S.
GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 19.3, at 7 (2d ed. 1986) [hereafter HARPER, JAMES & GRAY].
33. See 59 A.L.R. 468 (1929).
[l]n the situation to which res ipsa loquitur as a distinctive rule applies, there is no evidence,
circumstantial or otherwise, at least none of sufficient probative value, to show negligence,
apart from the postulate--which rests on common experience and not on the specific circums-
tances of the instant case-that physical causes of the kind which produced the accident in
question do not ordinarily exist in the absence of negligence; that is, in the absence of a
breach of duty such as defendant owed to plaintiff.
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There, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover despite the fact that abso-
lutely no evidence was offered concerning the specifics of the defendant's
conduct. 35 For example, the plaintiff offered no evidence to indicate that
the defendant had stored the flour barrel inappropriately, that he was mov-
ing it in an unsafe manner, that certain safety mechanisms were not in
place, or any other allegation that might indicate specific negligenct con-
duct by the defendant.36 Yet, due to the injury and the surrounding cir-
cumstances, the court stated that the defendant must have been negligent
(in some unknown and unspecifiable manner). 37 Here, then, is a dramatic
distinction between cases involving the application of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine and ordinary circumstantial evidence cases: with res ipsa, the
plaintiff no longer need satisfy the traditional requirement of proving the
defendant's specific conduct. 38
There is yet another fundamental distinction between ordinary cir-
cumstantial evidence cases and those involving the application of res ipsa
loquitur, however-one that often goes unnoticed. Over the years, the no-
tion has developed that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be applied not
only in cases like Byrne v. Boadle where the particular accident at issue
"could not" or "would not" have occurred unless there was negligence 39
(thereby making causally negligent conduct on the particular occasion a
prerequisite to recovery), but also in cases where the type of accident at
issue ordinarily could not, would not, or does not occur unless there is
negligence, thereby creating the possibility of recovery when no negligent
conduct occurred whatsoever on the particular occasion.40
Id.
34. Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. 299.
35. The court said that not even a "scintilla" of evidence had been proffered. Id. at 300.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 301.
38. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 154, at 372.
39. It has been observed that the phrasing of subsection (a) is ambiguous. David Kaye, Probability
Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1461-64 (1979). However, while Kaye argues
that the ambiguity lies with the phrase "ordinarily does not occur," Richard W. Wright has pointed out
that the real ambiguity lies in the meaning of the phrase "in the absence of." See id; Richard W.
Wright, Liability for Possible Wrongs: Causation, Statistical Probability, and the Burden of Proof 41
LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1295, 1336 n.144 [hereafter Possible Wrongs]. As Wright correctly discerns, if "in
the absence of negligence" is interpreted as meaning "if there is no negligence," then condition (a)
simply means that accidents of this type do not usually occur when there is no negligence. Id. The fact
that an accident usually does not occur when there is no negligence, however, does not permit the
inference that an accident is usually due to negligence when it does occur. The phrase "in the absence of
negligence" in the Restatement Second, therefore, should be replaced with "unless there is negligence."
Id.
40. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D.
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Allowing an inference of negligence when an accident does not ordi-
narily occur in the absence of negligence implies the conclusion that an
abstract probability-a non-case-specific ex ante probability indicating that
negligence causes a particular injury more than fifty percent of the time-
would, by itself, constitute sufficient "evidence" to raise a prima facie case
of negligent causation in a particular situation under res ipsa. Herein lies
the problem, however: such abstract probabilistic information, which is
completely detached from and in no way based upon the specific facts of
the case, cannot qualify as "circumstantial evidence" in the traditional
sense of the phrase.41 An example will illustrate the point.42 Assume that a
defendant fails to stop at a stop sign fifty-five percent of the time and
comes to a complete stop the other forty-five percent of the time. On one
particular day, the defendant is involved in an accident with another vehicle
at that very intersection. Does the abstract probability that the defendant
fails to stop at the stop sign fifty-five percent of the time help us determine
whether the defendant actually failed to stop on this particular occasion
and, thus, acted negligently?
The point of the hypothetical is to illustrate that abstract probabilities
about aggregated events tell us nothing about what actually has taken place
on any particular occasion. 43 Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is
traditionally thought of as evidence which, although not direct, is still con-
crete information about particular facts specific to the case at hand.44
Again, an example is long skid mark left on the road by the defendant's
vehicle on the particular occasion as circumstantial evidence that the de-
fendant was traveling at a high rate of speed.45 Circumstantial evidence,
unlike abstract probabilities, has probative value for determining what ac-
tually occurred. 46
41. See, e.g., HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 32, § 19.5, at 7-8 (discussing circumstantial
evidence and assuming it to be particularistic in nature, not mere statistical data); United States v.
Veysey, 334 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2003).
42. This example is borrowed from Richard W. Wright, Tort Law: Basic Principles of Liability,
Chapter 5, § B.3, at 367-68 (December 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author at
Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law) [hereafter Basic Principles].
43. Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof"
Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1050-52 (1988) [hereaf-
ter Bramble Bush]. See also United States v. Veysey, 334 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2003); Howard v.
Wal-Mart Stores, 160 F.3d 358, 359-60 (7th Cir. 1998); Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone Co., 966 F.
Supp. 874, 875-76 (W.D. Mo. 1996); Sargent v. Mass. Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass. 1940);
Day v. Boston & Maine R.R., 52 A. 771, 774 (Me. 1902).
44. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 185, at 308; FRIEDLAND, supra note
30, § 1.06, at 6.
45. KEETON, supra note 1, § 39, at 242.
46. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 185, at 308-09; Wright, Bramble Bush, supra
note 44, at 1050-52.
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B. The Source of the Confusion
If this is the case, however, and such a large distinction exists between
abstract probabilities and circumstantial evidence, why do commentators
assume that, by demonstrating that something does not "ordinarily occur in
the absence of negligence," a plaintiff has raised a prima facie case of neg-
ligence through circumstantial evidence?47 The answer lies in the fact that
some commentators seem to have assumed that because all evidence,
whether direct or circumstantial, is never 100 percent conclusive but rather
"probabilistic" in terms of establishing any particular ultimate fact, it fol-
lows that any sort of probability can satisfy the evidentiary standard in a
tort action, namely, proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 48
There are two substantial problems with this line of reasoning. First,
such reasoning wrongly assumes that all probabilities-whether abstract
probabilities or probabilities based on direct or circumstantial evidence
specific to the particular occasion-are equivalent and equally relevant for
resolving the question of liability.49 Therefore, so the logic presumably
goes, just as the trier of fact can make a determination of liability based
solely upon circumstantial evidence, so too can the trier of fact make a
determination of liability based solely upon abstract probabilities.
The second problem with such reasoning is that it requires that the
preponderance of the evidence standard in a tort action be reduced to a
mere statistical probability. 50 Both of these assumptions will be discussed
at length in Part II. For now, however, it is sufficient to recognize that an
abstract probability does not serve the same function as circumstantial evi-
dence, which is case-specific.
Despite the problems that accompany equating abstract probabilities
with circumstantial evidence, many courts, as we have noted, have (perhaps
47. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 1, § 42, at 200; RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D
cmt. b. But see RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 17 cmt. a (referring to res ipsa loquitur as
"circumstantial evidence of a quite distinctive form.").
48. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.2, at 520-21 (1986) (arguing
that allowing plaintiffs to win by producing only abstract evidence would be wrong, not because ab-
stract probabilities tell us nothing about what actually occurred, but because to allow plaintiffs to do so
would result in the perverse incentive for plaintiffs to seek out only abstract probabilities that suggest
that a particular defendant probably negligently caused the plaintiffs injury and no additional, particu-
laristic evidence); Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 360 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that "all
evidence is probabilistic in the sense of lacking absolute certainty" and arguing that courts have rejected
abstract statistics in ordinary negligence (non-res ipsa) cases, not because they are unable to prove that
a defendant's negligence actually caused a plaintiff's injury, but rather because the inability of a plain-
tiff to offer anything more than abstract statistics suggests that the plaintiff has been lazy in pursuing
evidence in support of her case or, alternatively, has secretly found evidence which defeats her case).
49. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmts. b & c.
50. Wright, Possible Wrongs, supra note 39, at 1311-17.
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inadvertently) incorporated this logic into their formulations of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, thereby theoretically allowing plaintiffs to satisfy the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard for proof of negligent causation
by relying on abstract probabilities. 51 Graham v. Badger,52 an opinion au-
thored by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was one of the earliest opinions to
articulate the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this way. Holmes therein de-
fined res ipsa as
merely a short way of saying that, so far as the court can see, the jury
from their experience as men of the world may be warranted in thinking
that an accident of this particular kind commonly does not happen except
in consequence of negligence, and that therefore there is a presumption
of fact, in the absence of explanation or other evidence which the jury
believes, that it happened in consequence of negligence in this case.5
As has been pointed out, in the now commonly accepted formulation
of the doctrine, the word "commonly" is replaced with "ordinarily": the
trier of fact must conclude that the injury is of such a nature that it "ordina-
rily would not occur in the absence of negligence by the defendant."' 54 And
although the terms "ordinarily" or "commonly" could be interpreted as
"generally" or "almost all the time," they instead are usually interpreted as
merely requiring a commonsense, unquantified probability that the defen-
dant was negligent.55
51. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 32, § 19.6, at 32-37 & accompanying notes. This is true
whenever a court allows a jury to conclude that the injury is one that ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of negligence based solely upon a "gut instinct" or the generalized notion of "common expe-
rience," rather than upon case-specific evidence. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, §
328D cmt. d.
52. 41 N.E. 61 (Mass. 1895).
53. Id. at 61 (emphasis added). Holmes may not have been equating abstract probabilities with
circumstantial evidence; rather, he may have merely viewed res ipsa as a "second best" liability doc-
trine. Nonetheless, by phrasing res ipsa in this way, he at least opened the door to allowing plaintiffs to
satisfy the evidentiary standard by way of mere probabilities.
54. See e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 438 (Cal. 1944).
55. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmt. e (Recovery under res ipsa
loquitur is permissible when "[i]t is enough that the facts proved reasonably permit the conclusion that
negligence is the more probable explanation.") (emphasis added); Hartnett v. O'Rourke, 69 Fed. Appx.
971, 979-80 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the requirement that an injury would not ordinarily occur in
the absence of negligence requires a balancing of probabilities to see what most likely caused an in-
jury); Pacella v. Resorts Casino Hotel, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72941, 13-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating
that in order to "invoke the res ipsa doctrine, a plaintiff need not eliminate all other explanations for the
accident, but rather must merely show 'that it is more probable than not that the defendant's negligence
was a proximate cause of the mishap."') (emphasis added); Triche v. Overnite Transp. Co., 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7233, at 13 (E.D. La. 1996) (quoting Sport v. Otis Elevator Co., 601 So. 2d 1355, 1362
(La. 1992)); Holmes v. Gamble, 644 P.2d 405, 408-09 (Col. 1982); see also supra note 51.
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II. SHOULD ABSTRACT STATISTICS BE ALLOWED WITH RESIPSA?
Thus far, we have noted that proof of negligence through abstract
probabilities cannot be equated with proof of negligence through case-
specific, circumstantial evidence. 56 We have also recognized (and tacitly
criticized) that, by phrasing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as requiring
proof that the type of accident or injury that occurred does not "ordinarily
occur in the absence of negligence," courts have allowed the possibility of
recovery based upon abstract probabilities despite the inability of such
abstract statistics to indicate anything about what actually occurred on a
given occasion. 57 But why this criticism? Despite the gap in relevance be-
tween abstract probabilities and case-specific circumstantial evidence, one
might ask why abstract probabilities should not be allowed to satisfy the
plaintiffs burden of proof in a res ipsa case. After all, in many cases in-
volving application of res ipsa, no direct or circumstantial evidence exists
with which a plaintiff can prove a defendant's specific negligence; this is
the reason why the doctrine exists in the first place.58 Therefore, one might
argue that in many res ipsa cases, including the very first, Byrne v.
Boadle,59 abstract probabilities might be the best that an injured plaintiff
can be expected to offer. Should not courts allow what abstract statistics
indicate probably occurred to be sufficient to allow the trier of fact to draw
an inference of causal negligence? Or even to allow such statistics to create
a rebuttable presumption of causal negligence?
Such questions recognize that abstract probabilities do not serve the
same function as case-specific circumstantial evidence, but imply that,
because of the unfortunate position of plaintiffs who are forced to resort to
res ipsa because of a lack of case-specific evidence, the court should apply
a looser evidentiary standard and allow abstract probabilities to carry the
day on the issues of negligence and causation. I believe that this argument
is a good one and one that will ultimately vindicate allowing recovery in
res ipsa cases based upon abstract probabilities. However, there are two
ways of justifying this result, only one of which is correct. First, one can
reach this result by reasoning that an abstract probability-indicating that
accidents like the one that occurred generally occur because a person in the
position of the defendant acted negligently-justifies a straightforward
56. See supra Part 1.
57. Id.
58. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 32, § 19.5, at 23-25.
59. Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 300.
[Vol 84:3
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
inference that the defendant was negligent in fact.60 Or second, one can
reach this conclusion based upon the simple policy argument that it is bet-
ter to allow a plaintiff to recover from a statistically-probably-negligent
defendant (even if the probability tells us nothing about what actually oc-
curred on the particular occasion) than it is to totally bar recovery for an
innocent, injured plaintiff with a statistically-probably-meritorious claim.
The first line of reasoning is as wrong as the second line of reasoning
is right. However, to illustrate why abstract probabilities do not justify
drawing a straightforward factual inference about what happened on a par-
ticular occasion, it is necessary to examine and deconstruct the two as-
sumptions that are essential to this line of reasoning.
A. Different Types of Probability
By simply inserting the word "ordinarily" into the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, many courts and commentators have implied (again, perhaps in-
advertently) that in the area of res ipsa, if an abstract probability suggests
that a defendant was negligent, this justifies drawing a straightforward
inference that a defendant was, in fact, negligent. 61 Again, this line of
thought seems to flow from the notion that all evidence (direct as well as
circumstantial) is probabilistic to a certain degree and, therefore, any prob-
abilistic data is equally probative for resolving the issue of liability, espe-
cially given the usual burden of proof in a tort case, which merely requires
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 62
However, other commentators have pointed out an important distinc-
tion between various types of probabilistic data.63 Professor Richard W.
Wright, in particular, has highlighted the existence of different types of
probabilities by distinguishing between naked statistics (which are not cau-
sally related at all: for example, the percentage of blue-colored buses in a
town), ex ante causal probabilities (which relate to "general causation" or
causal capacity: the frequency with which a condition of a certain type
causes a result of a certain type), and ex post causal probabilities (which
60. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmts. c & d. This method of reasoning, unfor-
tunately, is suggested by the Restatement Second in these comments.
61. Id. § 328D; PROSSER, supra note 1, § 42, at 202 (suggesting that the occurrence of a certain
type of accident that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence is itself evidence that the
accident was negligently caused).
62. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmt. b (assuming that the occurrence of an
accident that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence serves as circumstantial evidence
that a defendant was in fact negligent).
63. See, e.g., Robert N. Strassfeld, Causal Comparisons, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 913, 921 & ac-
companying notes (1992); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Liability and Individualized Evidence, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 203-06 (1986); Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 43, at 1050-67.
2010]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
relate to "specific causation": whether some actual condition actually
caused some actual result on this particular occasion). 64 For our purposes,
we can lump these various types of probabilities into two general catego-
ries: (1) non-specific probabilities (naked statistics and ex ante causal prob-
abilities) and (2) case-specific probabilities (ex post causal probabilities).
Non-specific probabilities are based upon data that is totally independent of
the particular occasion in question and therefore do not reflect which poten-
tially applicable causal explanation of an event or injury was actually in-
stantiated on the particular occasion. In other words, non-specific
probabilities say nothing about what actually took place on a given occa-
sion. An example of a non-specific probability is the one discussed above,
namely, the probability that, because a defendant fails to stop at a particular
stop sign fifty-five percent of the time, he probably did not stop on the
occasion in question. Notice that in this example, the non-specific probabil-
ity in no way provides the trier of fact with the evidence necessary to re-
solve the question of liability. Indeed, while the non-specific probability
assists one in betting on what will occur in the future or what likely oc-
curred in the past (even if it is a small likelihood), it does nothing to indi-
cate what actually did occur.65
Unlike a non-specific probability, a case-specific probability is one
that takes the concrete and particularistic pieces of evidence about the spe-
cific circumstances of a particular case into account. One arrives at a case-
specific probability by gathering the available concrete, particularistic (di-
rect and circumstantial) evidence of what actually happened in a case and
then comparing such evidence against all the possible causal explanations
of the event.66 Through this process, the available specific evidence helps
determine the likelihood (ex post causal probability) that a particular causal
explanation was actually instantiated on the occasion in question. For ex-
ample, a piece of evidence that would be necessary for the instantiation of
one potential causal explanation would increase the likelihood that that
particular explanation was actually instantiated. Conversely, if that piece of
evidence was incompatible with the instantiation of another possible causal
explanation, then that causal explanation would be eliminated. And finally,
if an available piece of evidence is necessary for every possible causal ex-
planation, such evidence would be wholly neutral for determining which
explanation was actually instantiated. In sum, one uses the available evi-
dence that is particular to the case at hand in order to determine the likelih-
64. Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 42, at 1050-51.
65. Id. at 1050-52.
66. Id.
[Vol 84:3
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
oods (ex post causal probabilities) of various plausible causal explanations
of the event at issue.67
One sees, then, that a large distinction exists between abstract, non-
specific probabilities and case-specific probabilities. While abstract, non-
specific probabilities are detached from the facts of a given case and thus
provide no information on what actually occurred on a particular occasion,
case-specific probabilities are truly helpful since they are based upon the
known evidence about the specifics of a particular case and reflect the
probability that a particular causal story was the one that was actually in-
stantiated in that case. Although even case-specific probabilities (and de
facto, direct and circumstantial evidence, upon which case-specific proba-
bilities are based) do not indicate with absolute certainty what actually
occurred, because they are based on case-specific evidence, they provide
relevant and useful information to the trier of fact in determining what
causal story was actually instantiated.68
One would assume that courts and commentators recognize the dis-
tinction between abstract, non-specific probabilities and case-specific prob-
abilities. Most of the time, this assumption would be correct, especially
when the non-specific probability is a naked (not causally-related) statistic.
Because of their obvious inability to say anything about what actually took
place on a given occasion, courts have generally refused to accept naked
statistics as relevant evidence of who or what caused a particular injury.69
They have correctly viewed such naked statistics as insufficient to satisfy
the preponderance of the evidence standard, no matter how high the proba-
bilities might be70 and have instead allowed a defendant to be held liable
only based upon case-specific probabilities (due to their case-specific na-
ture and resulting relevance). 71
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Smith v. Rapid Transit, 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945). In this case, the plaintiff
was operating her vehicle in the early morning hours when a bus traveling in the opposite direction
forced her off the road and into a parked vehicle. Id. at 754. The plaintiff proffered no particularistic
evidence, but only (1) that the defendant bus company was the only company that had been granted
authority to operate a bus route upon the street where the accident took place, and (2) that the bus
schedule indicated that defendant's busses would have been operating at the time at which the accident
occurred. Id. at 754-55. The court directed a verdict for the defendant stating that it is "not enough that
mathematically the chances somewhat favor a proposition to be proved." Id. at 755 (citing Sargent v.
Mass. Accident Co., 307 Mass. 246, 250 (1940)).
70. Smith, 58 N.E.2d at 755; Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 406 F.2d 1315, 1318 (3d Cir.
1969); Spencer v. Baxter Int'l , Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 74, 80 n.7 (D. Mass. 2001); see also Wright,
Bramble Bush, supra note 43, at 1050 nn.271-72.
71. Drawing the line here makes sense. While a risk of error still exists with allowing recovery
based upon ex post, case-specific probabilities, that risk is obviously much lower than the risk that
would accompany allowing recovery based upon abstract, ex ante probabilities. As we have noted, case-
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When it comes to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, however, courts
(apparently) have not been so skeptical of abstract, non-specific probabili-
ties. Indeed, whether they realize it or not, by formulating res ipsa as mere-
ly requiring that the injury be of such a nature that it "ordinarily would not
occur in the absence of negligence," they have opened the door to allowing
recovery based upon the same type of probabilistic information that they
have explicitly rejected in other types of cases. 72 This is particularly re-
markable when one considers that of all the various types of cases, those
involving res ipsa loquitur are the ones most likely to be lacking in any
specific evidence of negligence. Hence, courts should be on high-alert.
B. Is the "Preponderance of the Evidence" Merely a Greater Than Fifty
Percent Probability?
This brings us to consideration of the second problematic assumption
underlying the notion that non-specific probabilities allow the trier of fact,
under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, to draw a straightforward, factual infe-
rence of negligent causation. This second assumption may (and often does)
exist in any situation where the trier of fact draws an inference based upon
probabilistic information, including negligence actions involving case-
specific direct or circumstantial evidence, since even such case-specific
evidence only gives rise to case-specific probabilities rather than certainties
regarding what actually occurred.
The fact that all evidence, even case-specific evidence, is essentially
probabilistic leads many to assume that proving a proposition is always
merely a matter of reaching a certain numerical threshold or probability,
specific probabilities are based on case-specific evidence and are thus highly relevant. Ex ante, non-
specific probabilities, on the other hand, provide no information about what actually occurred in the
particular case.
72. This general aversion to abstract, class-based probabilistic data has also been highlighted in
various opinions where courts have rejected certain controversial legal doctrines. For example, when
presented with the issue of whether to adopt the doctrine of proportionate liability based on market
shares, some courts have rejected the doctrine altogether on the basis that to accept such a doctrine
would be to allow "too great a deviation" from traditional tort principles. See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 344-45 (I11. 1990). Their point has been that to allow recovery based upon an
abstract probability indicating how much of the market share a particular defendant produced is unreli-
able due to the fact that the statistic says nothing about whether the particular defendant actually caused
the particularly injury at issue. Id. at 343-45. Ironically, however, even the courts that have adopted the
doctrine seem to possess similar concerns. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38
(Cal. 1980). In Sindell, the California Supreme Court appears to have accepted the proportionate liabili-
ty doctrine at least partly out of the concern that basing liability on an abstract probability of causation
would allow a defendant to be held fully liable for every injury caused by a product if such defendant
produced greater than fifty percent of the product on the market. Id. Whether courts have accepted the
doctrine of market share liability, however, is not the point; the primary point is that courts are wary of
abstract, class-based statistics in this area.
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and that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard in a tort action mere-
ly requires that the probability be greater than fifty percent. 73 However,
there are significant problems with this assumption as well.
In all cases, even if the probabilities being employed are ex post, case-
specific probabilities of what actually occurred rather than mere ex ante,
non-specific probabilities, a risk exists that the "probable" causal explana-
tion was not actually instantiated on the occasion at issue. Therefore, even
if the trier of fact follows the ex post, case-specific probabilistic informa-
tion in such a case, she may arrive at the wrong conclusion. This reality
raises the question of whether in any case (whether those involving direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence, case-specific probabilities or non-
specific probabilities) the preponderance of the evidence standard should
be equated with a mere numerical probability, namely, any probability
greater than fifty percent. In other words, should triers of fact engage in the
practice of equating evidentiary standards with numerical probabilities?
Two primary reasons exist for answering this question in the negative.
First, equating an evidentiary standard with a mere numerical probability
again submerges the distinction between various types of probabilities and
fails to clarify for the trier of fact what type of evidence is required to satis-
fy the standard. And second, equating the preponderance of the evidence
with a greater than fifty percent probability misleads the trier of fact since it
encourages a focus on the percentage of probability rather than indepen-
dently evaluating and weighing the evidence to see if such evidence estab-
lishes a belief within her that rises to the requisite degree of certainty. For
example, in a tort action, instead of instructing (or allowing) jurors to
equate the preponderance of the evidence with a greater than fifty percent
probability and to impose liability when the probability of instantiation of
the relevant causal story rises above fifty percent, courts generally ask ju-
rors to consider and weigh all of the evidence and to make a determination
as to whether such evidence has generated a belief-no matter how minim-
73. Thomson, supra note 63, at 200; RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 17 cmt. d; CLOSING
INSTRUCTIONS - DEFINITION OF PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, ALASKA CIVIL PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 02.04 (1981, Revised 1999) available at http://www.state.ak.us/courts/insciv/02.04.doc.
The instructions state that the preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied:
... if you believe that there is a greater than 50 percent chance that it is true. Fifty-one per-
cent probability is enough; no more is required for you to decide that something is more likely
true than not true. If you believe that the chance that something is true is 50/50 or less, you
must decide that it is not true.
Id. But see L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 76-81 (1977); C.M.A. McCau-
liff, Burdens of Proof. Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1331-32 (1982) (indicating that many judges object to and refuse to interpret
burdens of proof in terms of quantitative probabilities when asked to do so by researchers); see also
Wright, Possible Wrongs, supra note 39, nn.68-70 & accompanying text.
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al-that a particular causal explanation was instantiated on the relevant
occasion. 74 Such a belief is generated when the ex post, case-specific prob-
ability that one causal story was actually instantiated sufficiently out-
weighs, qualitatively and quantitatively and in a manner differing for each
decision maker, the ex post, case-specific probability of any competing
story.75 If the evidence has generated even a minimal belief that the defen-
dant was negligent, then-and only then-has the preponderance standard
been satisfied.76 This focus-on belief rather than on a mere numerical
probability-is the correct approach insofar as it causes the trier of fact to
focus on the evidence in any given case, rather than upon a distracting nu-
merical probabilistic figure. As a result, the preponderance of the evidence
standard cannot and should not be equated with a statistical probability.
III. WHY THE SECOND RESTATEMENT GOT IT RIGHT (ALMOST)
Despite the fact that including "ordinarily" in the formulation of res
ipsa opens the door to recovery by a plaintiff in the absence of any case-
specific evidence that the defendant was negligent or even contributed to
the plaintiffs injury, courts have continued to allow recovery based upon
abstract probabilities where the plaintiff is unable, due to the nature of the
accident, to offer specific evidence that the defendant negligently caused
the injury. Even as this door to attaching liability has been swung open,
however, courts have simultaneously added various limiting instructions to
the doctrine of res ipsa in the hope that such limitations will serve as safe-
guards that will assist in reducing the possibility of subjecting innocent
defendants to liability. 77
Given proper limiting instructions, the decision to allow liability based
upon abstract probabilities under the broader version of res ipsa loquitur
74. 3 KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 104.01, at 135 (5th ed. 2000)). Juries are frequently instructed that:
To 'establish by a preponderance of the evidence' means to prove that something is more
likely so than not so. In other words, a preponderance of the evidence means such evidence
as, when considered and compared with that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and
produces in your minds belief that what is sought to be proved is more likely true than not
true.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 43, at 1065 n.339 (indicating that
empirical studies have discerned that few judges, jurors, or lay persons interpret the "preponderance of
the evidence" as requiring merely a greater-than-fifty-percent probability); Livanovitch v. Livanovitch,
131 A. 799, 800 (Vt. 1926) (quoting the trial court's jury instruction: "If... you are more inclined to
believe from the evidence that he did so deliver the bonds to the defendant, even though your belief is
only the slightest degree greater than that he did not, your verdict should be for the plaintiff.").
75. Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 43, at 1051-52.
76. Wright, Possible Wrongs, supra note 39, at 1311-17.
77. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 154, at 371, § 157, at 378-81, § 160, at 385-88.
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doctrine is ultimately a good one. This conclusion is reached only by way
of the policy consideration, discussed supra, that it is better to burden a
probably negligent defendant with exculpating himself from liability than it
is to bar recovery by a plaintiff with a probably-meritorious claim. Howev-
er, the justification for doing so-to allow recovery where it is appropriate
and to bar recovery where it is not-depends heavily upon the phraseology
and proper application of the limiting instructions that accompany the core
rule of res ipsa.
A. The Limiting Instructions
Even as courts have made the policy-motivated leap in the area of res
ipsa of allowing recovery based on abstract probabilities, they have simul-
taneously evinced a lack of ease in doing so and a fear that res ipsa is per-
haps being extended too far.78 As a result, almost all courts over the
decades have added various limiting instructions to the core rule. In the
introduction, I pointed out that in res ipsa cases, despite a plaintiffs ina-
bility to offer specific evidence that the defendant negligently caused her
injury, the plaintiff must still proffer some sort of evidence indicating that:
(1) someone's negligence caused her injury and (2) the defendant was that
someone. All of the limiting instructions that courts have utilized over the
years directly relate to the second requirement: the proper identification of
the responsible person.
Certain limiting instructions enjoyed great popularity for long periods
of time. One such limitation, which is still often stated but rarely literally
enforced, requires that the defendant must have had exclusive control over
the thing causing the injury79 or, even more strict, that the "defendant had
exclusive control over the plaintiff and over instrumentalities affecting the
plaintiff' at the time of the injury. 80 Over time, many courts have come to
realize that this requirement is simply too strict and undermines the purpose
for which res ipsa exists. 81 Moreover, they have recognized that the defen-
dant's exclusive control is merely one way of implicating the defendant as
the responsible party and that other types of evidence might serve that pur-
78. Id. § 154, at 371.
79. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 438 (Cal. 1944).
80. Haas v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 755, 761 (Mass. 1980) (emphasis added).
81. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmt g; see e.g., Spott v. Otis Elevator Co., 601
So. 2d 1355, 1362 (La. 1992) (stating that "[t]he second requirement, that the defendant have exclusive
control over the thing, has not, in our jurisprudence, been strictly applied.").
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pose.82 As a result, this element, even when it is included as a limiting in-
struction, is almost never literally applied. 83
Another popular limiting instruction was the requirement that the
available evidence sufficiently eliminate the possibility that the plaintiff
negligently contributed to his or her own injury84 or, even more broadly,
that there have been no "voluntary contribution by the plaintiff. '8 5 Inter-
preted literally, this requirement could never be satisfied, since the plaintiff
always contributes to his or her own injury, if only by causing herself to be
at the place where the injury occurred at the time that it occurred. Moreo-
ver, now that contributory negligence is no longer a complete defense and
comparative negligence is the generally accepted doctrine, this element is
overly restrictive even if it merely requires (as presumably was intended)
proof of no negligent contribution by the plaintiff. Many courts have held
that an inference of causal negligence by the defendant is permissible even
if evidence exists that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 86
Courts have also attempted to control a plaintiffs resort to res ipsa
through requiring that a defendant have superior access than the plaintiff to
evidence of what actually occurred. 87 This requirement proved handy in
many of the same cases where the exclusive control requirement would
have been helpful; it often would be satisfied where the defendant was in
control of the instrument causing the harm.88 A good example would be
actions by passengers against carriers. However, cases also exist where a
defendant lacks superior access to the evidence, but where courts should
not prohibit the use of res ipsa loquitur. Examples might include a bottle
exploding, 89 a grenade detonating prematurely,90 or certain situations
where a falling object strikes a passerby.91 Although a defendant in one of
these or other situations might not have superior knowledge as to why an
accident or malfunction occurred, courts have applied and should apply res
ipsa.
82. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 157, at 378.
83. E.g., Escola, 150 P.2d at 438-39.
84. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 42, at 199.
85. Ochoa v. Vered, 186 P.3d 107, 114 (Col. Ct. App. 2008).
86. Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, 619 P.2d 66, 70 (Col. 1980); Giles v. City of New
Haven, 636 A.2d 1335, 1341-42 (Conn. 1994); Dyback v. Weber, 500 N.E.2d 8, 12 (I1. 1986); Tipton
v. Texaco, Inc., 712 P.2d 1351, 1359 (N.M. 1985); Watzig v. Tobin, 642 P.2d 651, 654-65 (Or. 1982);
Cyr v. Green Mountain Power Corp, 485 A.2d 1265, 1269 (Vt. 1984); Turk v. H. C. Prange Co., 119
N.W.2d 365, 372 (Wis. 1963).
87. Cox v. May Dep't Store Co., 903 P.2d 1119, 1124 (Ariz. 1995).
88. See DOBBS, supra note 1, § 160, at 386-87.
89. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 437-38 (Cal. 1944).
90. See, e.g., McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 774, 774 (5th Cir. 1988).
91. See, e.g., Anderson v. Serv. Merch. Co., Inc., 485 N.W.2d 170, 172-73 (Neb. 1992).
[Vol 84:3
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
B. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 328D
Although the above limiting instructions do not cover the entire gamut
of those utilized by the courts in their attempts to curb an overly broad
operation of res ipsa loquitur, such limiting instructions have often proved
to be too strict or even unhelpful for accomplishing their intended purpose.
Various opinions can be found where limiting instructions prevented re-
covery in cases that appear legitimate92 and allowed recovery in others
where the invocation of res ipsa seems particularly suspect. 93
Amid the confusion created by these various limitations, the formula-
tion of res ipsa loquitur found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
emerged. 94 Although not perfect, this formulation went a long way towards
arriving at an articulation of res ipsa that took proper consideration of the
predicament of a plaintiff who is unable to prove specific acts of negli-
gence because of the nature of the accident while still including a relatively
strong and helpful limiting instruction so as to avoid subjecting individuals
to liability who: (a) acted reasonably with regard to the accident/injury; (b)
had absolutely no connection to the accident/injury; (c) both a and b; or (d)
acted negligently but such negligence did not cause the accident/injury.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D reads in its entirety as follows:
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by
negligence of the defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the ab-
sence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff
and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's
duty to the plaintiff.
(2) It is the function of the court to determine whether the inference may
be reasonably drawn by the jury, or whether it must necessarily be
drawn.
(3) It is the function of the jury to determine whether the inference is to
be drawn in any case where different conclusions may reasonably be
reached. 9 5
92. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 42, at 205 & n.30; see Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 158 A. 720, 721 (R.I.
1932).
93. Calabretta v. Nat'l Airlines, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 32, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (allowing recovery
against an airline under res ipsa where an airline passenger suffered a hearing loss after she experienced
ear pain while the airplane was in descent). While the presence of the exclusive control limiting instruc-
tion was not likely the only cause for the dubious result reached by the court here, the fact that it was
satisfied may likely have led the court to reach the result that it did. Id at 35-36.
94. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D.
95. Id.
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The concern for injured plaintiffs is illustrated in the Restatement
Second by the choice of the drafters to include the word "ordinarily" in the
wording of the doctrine. 96 The drafters discerned that the trier of fact
should be allowed to draw an inference of negligence where past expe-
rience "reasonably permits the conclusion that such events do not ordinari-
ly occur unless someone has been negligent. '97 By allowing the trier of fact
to draw the inference on the basis of common experience, the Restatement
Second agrees with the great weight of authority that proving negligence
may be accomplished by pointing to abstract probabilities alone in the ab-
sence of any concrete, case-specific evidence. 98 In other words, an abstract
probability is deemed sufficient, in the context of res ipsa, to show that
negligence was the cause of an injury.99
Immediately following the recitation of the core res ipsa rule, howev-
er, the drafters of the Restatement Second included a new limiting instruc-
tion in place of the traditional ones discussed previously. The instruction
reads: "(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff
and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence."' 00
C. The Purpose of the Subsection (b) Limiting Instruction
In order to properly understand this limiting instruction, it is necessary
to interpret the word "responsible" as "possibly negligent."'' 1 This inter-
pretation is necessary because the drafters make clear in their comments
that once one has moved from the core rule of res ipsa to the limiting in-
struction, the analysis of whether negligence was the cause of the injury has
terminated and the focus has now shifted to identifying the party who en-
gaged in the negligent conduct. 102 The accompanying comment describes
the purpose of this limiting instruction in relation to the core rule of res
ipsa by stating that, "It is never enough for the plaintiff to prove that he
was injured by the negligence of some person unidentified. It is still neces-
96. Id. & cmt. c.
97. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmt. c.
98. Unfortunately, it appears in comments c, d, and especially e that the drafters arrived at this
result incorrectly by believing that abstract probabilities allow the trier of fact to draw a straightforward
inference of negligence sufficient to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard. However, this
is not completely clear. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmts. c, d & e.
99. Id. at cmts. d & e.
100. Id. § 328D(1)(b).
101. Wright, Basic Principles, supra note 42, Chapter 5, § B.3, at 366.
102. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmt. f.
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sary to make the negligence point to the defendant."' 103 Therefore, the focus
of the limiting instruction is clearly on the identity of the tortfeasor.
If, on the other hand, the phrase "responsible causes" were interpreted
to include all possible explanations of the injury, including those for which
no negligent conduct was involved, the plaintiff would be required to prove
that the defendant's (presumed negligent) conduct was the sole cause of the
plaintiffs injury, without any negligent or non-negligent contribution by
the plaintiff or any third party or by natural events-which would never be
true. If, however, the word "responsible" is interpreted as "possibly negli-
gent," then the focus of the limiting instruction is on ensuring that it was
the defendant's (presumed) negligence that caused the plaintiffs injury, as
the accompanying comment suggests it should be, and not the possibly
negligent conduct of some other person. 104
Even as so interpreted, the subsection (b) limitation is too strict. Be-
cause of the fairly recent shift in tort law from contributory negligence
serving as an absolute bar on recovery to comparative responsibility, which
generally occurred after subsection (b) was drafted, the requirement in
subsection (b) that the plaintiff prove she did not negligently contribute to
her injury is now too strict. Many jurisdictions have explicitly stated that
evidence that a plaintiff negligently contributed to the injury no longer
automatically bars recovery under res ipsa while other courts have arrived
at the same result implicitly. 105 Nor should the possibility of negligent con-
tribution by other defendants automatically bar use of the res ipsa doctrine.
Rather, in such cases the plaintiff should still be allowed to utilize the doc-
trine if negligent conduct by the plaintiff or other defendants would not
have been sufficient to produce the injury in the absence of (the presumed)
negligent conduct by the defendant. Subsection (b) should be revised to
require that other possibly negligent causes, including the conduct of the
plaintiff and third persons, have "either (i) been sufficiently eliminated by
the evidence or (ii) would not have been sufficient to produce the harm in
the absence of negligence by the defendant."' 106
D. The Necessity of the (Revised) Subsection (b) Limiting Instruction
As modified, the subsection (b) limiting instruction contains an
enormously important concept which plays a fundamental and necessary
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 86.
106. Wright, Basic Principles, supra note 42, Chapter 5, § B.3, at 366.
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role in properly achieving the goals underlying res ipsa loquitur. The limi-
tation requires that the plaintiffs evidence must sufficiently eliminate all
other explanations of the injury where negligence by the plaintiff or third
parties might have been the cause in the absence of any negligence by the
defendant. There are two reasons why this limiting instruction is so helpful.
First, the existence of such a limiting instructions still allows room for
the policy concern underlying res ipsa: that there are situations where an
injured plaintiff should be entitled to recover even though she is unable to
produce specific evidence of a defendant's negligent conduct. In other
words, this limiting instruction does not prevent the operation of the "ordi-
narily" language in the core rule of res ipsa loquitur and, hence, a plaintiff
may still recover where only abstract probabilities suggest that negligence
was the cause of the injury. Hence, the policy concern is satisfied.
The second reason why this limiting instruction is so important is be-
cause it effectively balances the allowance of recovery based on a non-
specific statistical probability of negligent causation by requiring that
something, rather than nothing but an abstract probability, indicate this
particular defendant's (probably negligent) involvement in the plaintiffs
injury. 107 It is not enough, in other words, to tell the defendant that "this
type of injury usually occurs because of negligence by people like you." On
the contrary, this instruction requires that the plaintiff offer concrete, case-
specific evidence indicating the identity of the relevant defendant who was
"probably negligent" under the core rule of res ipsa. Therefore, while the
nature of the injury may probabilistically indicate that the defendant was
negligent, the available evidence must indicate that the person has been
identified as the "probably negligent" cause of the injury. 108 If more than
one plausible causal story of the injury exists where either the defendant
negligently caused the injury or some third party negligently caused the
injury, and the evidence does not eliminate one of these explanations, a
plaintiff has not satisfied this element and, hence, cannot recover.
This may seem at first glance to undercut the purpose for which res
ipsa exists. It does not, but rather provides a critically important safeguard
against abuse of the doctrine. By allowing recovery where the injury suf-
fered by the plaintiff does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence,
the door is opened to recovery in situations where negligence may not have
been the cause of the injury in order to protect injured plaintiffs. However,
107. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmt. f (stating that "[i]t is never enough for the
plaintiff to prove that he was injured by the negligence of some person unidentified. It is still necessary
to make the negligence point to the defendant.").
108. See infra text following note 117.
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if we do not then enforce a strong limiting instruction that requires the
plaintiff to present case-specific evidence that she has identified the correct
"probably negligent" cause, then res ipsa has been extended too far and
recovery will be allowed and encouraged in situations where nothing but an
abstract probability indicates that somebody-anybody, for that matter-
was probably negligent and that such probable negligence probably caused
the plaintiffs injury. To allow this is to let the policy concern for injured
plaintiffs swallow up the requirement that the evidence must show in some
way that a particular defendant probably acted negligently and thereby
caused the plaintiff s injury on the specific occasion.
Although this may sound like a significant burden for plaintiffs that
effectively cancels out the protection afforded by the core rule of res ipsa,
common sense indicates that in the vast majority of cases plaintiffs will
have a much easier time gathering evidence that implicates a particular
individual than they will have gathering specific proof that the individual
was negligent. Consider Byrne v. Boadle, for example. 10 9 Although the
plaintiff had absolutely no evidence of what went wrong in that case, it was
relatively easy for him to gather evidence indicating that the defendant was
the source of whatever might have gone wrong.I 10 Likewise, in a case
where a hand grenade explodes, the plaintiff may have a hard time explain-
ing to a jury what went wrong, but a relatively easy time indicating who
was responsible for whatever might have gone wrong."' 1 Therefore, requir-
ing the plaintiff to produce case-specific evidence indicating the identity of
the wrongdoer, at least by excluding other possible wrongdoers, is not so
heavy a burden as one might initially think.
In sum, given subsection (b), the Restatement Second sufficiently ex-
pands res ipsa to serve those unfortunate plaintiffs who are able to offer
only abstract probabilistic evidence of negligence while still tightening
down the doctrine to require plaintiffs to offer case-specific evidence re-
garding the identity of the wrongdoer. The result is that subsection (b)
plays a crucial role in reducing the instances in which wholly innocent and
ignorant individuals will be subjected to liability. To accomplish this, how-
ever, subsection (b) must still be applied properly.
109. Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299.
110. Id. at 299-300.
111. See, e.g., McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 851 F.2d 774, 776-77 (5th Cir. 1988).
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E. Clarifications on How Subsection (b) Should Be Enforced
Although subsection (b) seems to solve the problems inherent in many
other limiting instructions, courts must still be aware of at least two poten-
tial ways in which it might be misapplied. First, although it may at first
sound contradictory, it is necessary to point out that every other causal
explanation of an injury involving negligence by someone other than the
defendant need not be eliminated by the evidence. Rather, only those ex-
planations that conflict with the plaintiff's explanation of the injury must be
sufficiently eliminated by the evidence. In other words, if two plausible
causal explanations exist that involve negligence by two different parties
and such causal explanations conflict with one another (such that either one
defendant or the other was negligent, but not both), subsection (b) has not
been satisfied. Indeed, in such a scenario, the trier of fact ipso facto could
not reasonably conclude that the available evidence had "sufficiently elimi-
nated" all plausible sources of causal negligence other than the defendant.
However, the situation is different if the plausible sources of causal
negligence do not conflict, but rather concur. The reason underlying this is
the obvious reality that there is not necessarily one and only one negligent
cause of any given injury. Indeed, it is for this reason that joint and several
liability exists. In any given negligence action, two (or more) parties can
behave negligently and can each be held liable for a single injury to a plain-
tiff, so long as both of them were a cause of such injury. For example, in a
medical malpractice action, both a doctor and a nurse may have negligently
caused the plaintiffs injury. Moreover, "but-for causation" may exist with
regard to both defendants such that if either the nurse or the doctor had
acted reasonably, the injury would not have resulted. In such a situation,
the plaintiff obviously need not eliminate the nurse as a possible cause of
the injury under subsection (b) so as to hold the doctor liable under res
ipsa. The reason why: the causal story of the doctor's negligence does not
conflict with the causal story of the nurse's negligence. Rather, both defen-
dants acted negligently and the plaintiff can hold either or both liable under
res ipsa by establishing that the possible negligence of the other defendant,
by itself, would not have been sufficient to produce the plaintiffs injury.
If, on the other hand, either the doctor or the nurse caused the injury,
but not both, the limiting instruction has not been satisfied and, hence, the
plaintiff cannot prevail under res ipsa. The proper formulation of the limit-
ing instruction requires that the evidence must either eliminate all plausible
negligent causes of an injury other the defendant's presumed negligence or
such other possible negligent causes must, in and of themselves, have been
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insufficient to have produced the injury absent negligent conduct by the
defendant.1 12
The second point regarding the limiting instruction in subsection (b)
that must be clarified is that courts should not allow this limiting instruc-
tion to operate in the same way as the core rule of res ipsa loquitur. Ab-
stract probabilities should not be able to "sufficiently eliminate" 113 other
potential defendants. 114 In other words, it should not be enough to present
abstract probabilities indicating that the type of injury at issue is both "or-
dinarily" caused by negligence and "ordinarily" committed by somebody
like the defendant. The limiting instruction itself is phrased rather well in
this regard insofar as it says that other possible explanations must be "suf-
ficiently eliminated by the evidence,"1 15 that is, case-specific facts must
eliminate all other (conflicting) negligent causes or reduce them to such a
small likelihood that their instantiation would be considered implausible. In
short, abstract probabilities are not "evidence" under subsection (b).
However, although subsection (b) itself is phrased rather well, the
comments accompanying subsection (b) confuse the matter and obfuscate
what the instruction clearly requires on its face. In commentf the drafters
state:
It is never enough for the plaintiff to prove that he was injured by the
negligence of some person unidentified. It is still necessary to make the
negligence point to the defendant. On this too the plaintiff has the burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence; and in any case where there
is no doubt that it is at least equally probable that the negligence was that
of a third person, the court must direct the jury that the plaintiff has not
proved his case. Again, however, the plaintiff is not required to exclude
all other possible conclusions beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is
enough that he makes out a case from which the jury may reasonably
conclude that the negligence was, more likely than not, that of the defen-
dant. 116
112. Wright, Basic Principles, supra note 42, Chapter 5, § B.3, at 366.
113. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D(1)(b).
114. Indeed, courts have generally said that abstract probabilities cannot be used to show that a
particular defendant was negligent. Rather, case specific evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, is a
necessary precondition for recovery. See, e.g., DiPalma v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 938 F.2d 1463,
1465 (1st Cir. 1991); Biggs v. Logicon, Inc., 663 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that "[t]here is no
evidence to suggest that defendant's conduct is more responsible for plaintiff's injury than the conduct
of others); Barnes v. United States, 349 F.2d 553, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1965); Carlos v. MTL, Inc., 883
P.2d 691, 701 (Ha. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that, "[e]ven if an accident and its attendant circumstances
'cry loudly of someone's negligence,' the res ipsa loquitur doctrine will not apply unless the plaintiff
produces evidence connecting the defendant as the negligent party.").
115. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D (emphasis added).
116. Id. § 328D cmt. f(emphasis added).
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Unfortunately, with these comments, the drafters seem to transform
the limiting instruction, like the issue of negligence, into a mere matter of
abstract probabilities. 1 7 They do so in two ways. First, although the draf-
ters require that a plaintiff prove this element by a preponderance of the
evidence, they do not state that this burden must be satisfied with actual
evidence, or even better, with "case-specific" evidence. Rather, the com-
ment simply states that the plaintiff must "make the negligence point to the
defendant."' 18 But, as anyone knows and as commentf can be read to imp-
ly, an abstract probability can "point" to a defendant without saying any-
thing about whether that defendant negligently caused the injury.119
A second way in which the drafters' comments confuse how subsec-
tion (b) should be understood and applied lies in the drafters' apparent un-
derstanding of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. In reference
to the limiting instruction, comment f reads "[o]n this too the plaintiff has
the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence," thereby indicat-
ing the drafters' intent that the preponderance of the evidence standard here
is satisfied in the same way as it is with regard to proving negligence in res
ipsa cases, namely, through purely abstract, ex ante, statistics. 120 However,
although the courts have made a special exception for proving negligence
in res ipsa cases such that the preponderance of the evidence standard can
be satisfied with respect to the core rule in subsection (a) by abstract prob-
abilities, this does not mean that courts should allow subsection (b) to be
satisfied in the same manner. Indeed, the very opposite is true. As soon as
subsection (b) is interpreted as an element that also can be satisfied with
abstract probabilities, res ipsa has mutated into a doctrine that invites re-
covery by plaintiffs where there has been no case-specific proof of negli-
117. It should be pointed out, however, that despite the fact that the drafters of the Restatement
Second sometimes suggest that subsection (b) can be satisfied with abstract probabilistic evidence, this
is contrary to the blackletter of subsection (b) and to the overall thrust of the comments insofar as
several of the comments consist of attempts to ensure that the inferred causal negligence was that of the
particular defendant. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmt. g (discussing case-
specific evidence of the defendants' control of the instrumentalities of harm), cmt. i (discussing the
requirement, although it is now obsolete, that a plaintiff offer case-specific evidence showing she did
not negligently contribute to her own injury), & cmt. n (discussing the possibility that defendants may
offer case-specific evidence indicating that they did not act negligently or that, if they did, such negli-
gence was not the cause of the plaintiff's injury).
118. Id atcmt.f.
119. For example, an ex ante probability might point to a particular defendant as being "probably
negligent," without indicating in any way that such defendant was negligent in fact.
120. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmt. f; cf id. at cmt. e:
The plaintiff's burden of proof... requires him to produce evidence which will permit the
conclusion that it is more likely than not that his injuries were caused by the defendant's neg-
ligence. Where the probabilities are at best evenly divided between negligence and its ab-
sence, it becomes the duty of the court to direct the jury that there is not [sic] sufficient proof.
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gence or even probable negligence by the defendant. Therefore, courts
should not allow subsection (b) to operate in the same way as the core rule
of res ipsa, but rather must apply it according to its own terms: stringently
and requiring case-specific "evidence" that the defendant was the probably-
negligent individual-a requirement which we have seen is not overly-
burdensome to plaintiffs.
If subsection (b) is applied appropriately with these concerns in mind,
it effectively complements the core rule of res ipsa insofar as it gives due
consideration to the plight of injured plaintiffs while also tightening down
the doctrine so as to prevent res ipsa loquitur from becoming a doctrine
based purely upon abstract probabilities and absolutely no case-specific
evidence.
IV. RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: A STEP
IN THE WRONG DIRECTION
Unfortunately, in the approved final draft of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 17 (2005) (hereafter Restatement
Third), the American Law Institute (ALl) took a step in the wrong direction
when it offered a new and highly-modified formulation of res ipsa loquitur.
Indeed, the drafters of the Restatement Third decided to eliminate entirely
subsection (b) from its formulation of res ipsa.12 1 By doing so, the ALI has
moved the doctrine a step away from the goals it is intended to serve and
has made it more difficult for courts and juries to understand and apply.
The formulation in the Restatement Third collapses the entirety of the res
ipsa doctrine into a single sentence with no elements. 122 Although the ALI
offered reasons for this dramatic change in the accompanying comments,
those reasons are unpersuasive in several respects. The changes, which
result from a misunderstanding of the traditional requirements of proof,
including the preponderance of the evidence standard, 123 enhance the pos-
sibility of recovery by plaintiffs where defendants are not at fault, while
also preventing recovery in some situations in which fault likely exists.
The formulation of res ipsa loquitur found in the Restatement Third
reads: "The factfinder may infer that the defendant has been negligent
when the accident causing the plaintiff s physical harm is a type of accident
that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a class of actors of
which the defendant is the relevant member." 124 Merely glancing at this
121. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 17.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., id. § 17 cmt. b.
124. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 17.
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formulation, one notes that dramatic changes have been made between the
phraseology in the Restatement Second and in the Restatement Third; the
drafters themselves acknowledge this. 125 Upon further reflection, however,
one recognizes that considerable changes have occurred with regard to the
substantive content of the doctrine as well.
In what appears to be a repudiation of the formulation of res ipsa
found in the Restatement Second, the drafters of the Restatement Third
state in the comments accompanying the black letter rule that some courts
have erroneously adopted a "two-step" approach according to which res
ipsa should apply "if the type of accident usually happens because of neg-
ligence, and if the negligence, when it occurs, is usually that of the defen-
dant, rather than of some other party."'126 Examining this fomulation, a
careful observer would correctly point out that this is not the formulation of
res ipsa found in the Restatement Second. The second "step," as described
by the drafters of the Restatement Third, can clearly be satisfied with an
abstract probability whereas subsection (b) in the Restatement Second can-
not; rather, subsection (b)-at least on its face in the black letter and as it
has been applied by the courts-must be satisfied with concrete, case-
specific evidence. 127 By erroneously interpreting and rephrasing the formu-
lation of res ipsa in the Restatement Second, the drafters of the Restatement
Third have effectively attacked a straw man. Moreover, they reject the
formulation in the Restatement Second for several erroneous reasons.
A. The Problem with the Restatement Third
The problem with the formulation of res ipsa loquitur in the Restate-
ment Third is that the drafters have transformed the doctrine from one that
requires at least some showing of case-specific evidence into one that, if
applied literally, can be completely satisfied by way of non-specific, ex
ante, abstract probabilities. What the drafters of the Restatement Second
unfortunately intimated here and there in the comments 128 (contrary to the
overall thrust of those comments and the practice of the courts),129 the draf-
ters of the Restatement Third have done in the actual black letter formula-
tion of res ipsa. By placing the word "ordinarily" at the beginning of the
125. Id. at cmt. b (rejecting the so-called "two-step formulation").
126. Id
127. See supra note 117 & accompanying text. As discussed, although there are points in the
comments where the drafters of the Restatement Second seem to suggest that subsection (b) can be
satisfied with abstract, probabilistic evidence, this is contrary to the blackletter of subsection (b) and the
overall thrust of the comments. Id.
128. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 13, § 328D cmt. f.
129. See supra note 126.
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rule and collapsing all of the probabilities into one, the drafters have taken
abstract probabilistic reasoning to a new level. No longer is any concrete,
case-specific evidence required indicating that negligence was the cause of
the injury or even that, if there was negligent causation, the defendant was
the responsible party. Rather, if an injury ordinarily occurs because of neg-
ligence and that negligence usually is committed by a certain type of per-
son, then such a person is at risk of being held liable under the Restatement
Third, even if she had absolutely no connection to the plaintiffs injury.130
This, indeed, is the primary shortcoming of the formulation of res ipsa
found in the Restatement Third. Although res ipsa was created for the pur-
pose of serving injured plaintiffs who have little to no information about
how their injury occurred, 131 traditionally the doctrine has always required
a showing of some sort of case-specific evidence that suggests negligence
was the cause and/or which points to a particular defendant. 132 According
to the formulation of res ipsa found in the Restatement Third, however, no
longer is this the case. Indeed, this new formulation suggests that recovery
will be possible through the mere presentation of naked statistics.
B. Why the Change?
According to the comments accompanying the Restatement Third, the
drafters' primary reason for rejecting the so-called two-step formulation
lies in their belief that res ipsa would be applied most effectively, efficient-
ly, and with the smallest likelihood of error by reducing the number of
probabilities in play within the doctrine. 133 The drafters' attempt at creating
a simplified formulation of res ipsa, however, is fundamentally flawed due
to (1) their reliance on a flawed understanding of what constitutes a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" 134 and (2) their related misunderstanding of
the nature of proof.135
130. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 17 cmt. b.
131. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 154, at 370.
132. Id. at 370-71. Dobbs correctly notes that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
jury is permitted to infer that the defendant was negligent in some unspecified way when, on
the evidence adduced, experience indicates (1) that the injury was probably the result of neg-
ligence, even though the exact nature of that negligence is unknown, and (2) that it was prob-
ably the defendant who was the negligent person [emphasis added].
Id. Although he uses the language of "probability," Dobbs also makes clear that some sort of case-
specific evidence relevant to these two issues must be adduced by the plaintiff. Id.
133. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 17 cmt. b.
134. Id. (equating the preponderance of the evidence standard with a greater-than-fifty percent
probability).
135. Id. (misunderstanding that each element of a claim need only be proven individually by a
preponderance of the evidence for the claim to succeed; the likelihood of each element need not be
multiplied together to see if the ultimate product also reaches some requisite statistical probability).
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First, throughout the entirety of the accompanying comments, the
drafters clearly adopt the erroneous assumption that the preponderance of
the evidence standard is merely a greater than fifty percent probability.
They repeatedly state that res ipsa should be applied whenever the abstract
probability of the defendant's negligent causation of the plaintiffs injury is
greater than fifty percent and, conversely, should not be applied when that
probability is fifty percent or less. 136 Although dubious in and of itself, this
assumption leads them to the conclusion that, because res ipsa under the
two-step approach consists of two statistical probabilities, one should fol-
low mathematical probability theory and multiply those two probabilities
together in order to uncover the probability that both of those elements
were satisfied on the occasion at issue. 137 For example, the drafters suggest
that there might be a greater than fifty percent probability that negligence
was the cause of the accident (say a two-thirds likelihood) and there might
be a greater than fifty percent probability that the defendant was the negli-
gent party (again, say a two-thirds likelihood), but when those two proba-
bilities are multiplied together, the probability that both of the elements
were satisfied is less than fifty percent (here it would be four-ninths). 138
Hence, according to the drafters, such a situation would not satisfy the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard and res ipsa should not apply. 139 Yet,
they point out that under the usual implementation of the two-step approach
to res ipsa, the probabilities are not multiplied together, thereby allowing
an erroneous inference of negligent causation by the defendant. 140
To avoid such erroneous inferences, the drafters of the Restatement
Third decided to simply reduce the number of probabilities from two to
one. 141 In comment b, they state that the two-step formulation is "unhelp-
ful" insofar as a "one-step inquiry will often be sufficient."' 142 They offer a
hypothetical situation in which a plaintiff has been injured and five possible
causal explanations for the injury exist, only two of which include negli-
gence by the defendant. See the chart below. In order to satisfy the first
"step" of the two-step formulation-whether the injury is ordinarily caused
by negligence-the drafters argue that the trier of fact would have to in-
Moreover, even under mathematical probability theory, the probability that both A and B are true is
equal to the product of the probability of each by itself being true only if A and B are probabilistically
independent events. Generally, this will not be true in the res ipsa context.
136. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 17 cmt. b.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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quire into whether negligence was the cause of the injury in at least one of
the other three scenarios as well, before proceeding to the second step.
Then, if negligence was "probably" the cause of the injury (meaning three
of the five causal stories involved negligence), the trier of fact would move
to Step 2, focusing only on the possible causal explanations involving neg-
ligence and asking whether the majority of those causal stories involved
causal negligence by the defendant. 143 But, the drafters state, this extended
inquiry is unnecessary because, under the single-step, Restatement Third
approach, the trier of fact already knows that the injury is not caused by
persons like the defendant sixty percent of the time; hence, res ipsa should
not apply. 144
Element Cause 1 Cause 2 Cause 3 Cause 4 Cause 5
Step 1 Negligence? Yes Yes ? ? ?
Step 2 Defendant's Yes Yes No No NoNegligence?
The drafters' fear that recovery might be improperly allowed where
multiple probabilities are individually greater than fifty percent but less
than fifty percent when multiplied together demonstrates a lack of under-
standing of the nature of proof. Under ordinary rules of proof, one need not
prove every element in a case to an extremely high degree of certainty in
order to prevail on the merits of the case. But this is exactly what would be
required under the drafters' approach. To illustrate, assume that a cause of
action consists of five elements. Further assume that the plaintiff has of-
fered evidence convincing the jury that there is roughly an eighty-five per-
cent chance that each of those elements has been satisfied. (In other words,
an eighty-five percent chance that element one was satisfied, an eighty-five
percent chance that element two was satisfied, and so on.) Clearly, the
plaintiff has proven her case. 145 Under the drafters' logic, however, multip-
lying these probabilities together results in only a forty-four percent proba-
bility that all of those elements were satisfied on the given occasion and,
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. COHEN, supra note 73, at 58-67, 116-120.
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hence, the plaintiff cannot recover. 146 This result demonstrates, once again,
why equating evidentiary standards with raw probabilistic numerical values
will lead to erroneous results. As Jonathan Cohen long ago demonstrated,
proof is not a matter of mathematically combining abstract statistical prob-
abilities, but rather a matter of inducing belief about what actually occurred
on a particular occasion based on case-specific evidence instantiating or
proving the lack of instantiation of competing stories of what actually oc-
curred on that occasion. 147
The drafters' argument that the so-called two-step approach is ineffi-
cient compared to their one-step approach also is fallacious. Rather than
treat the questions of negligence and the identity of the probably negligent
party as two separate issues, they claim, the trier of fact should look at
every possible causal explanation that offers an answer to both of these
questions, effectively reducing the two probabilities down to one. 148 If in
more than half of those causal explanations the defendant is the negligent
cause of the injury, then res ipsa should apply; conversely, if in less than
half of those causal explanations the defendant is not the negligent cause of
the injury, res ipsa should not apply. 149
The problem with the drafters' reasoning lies in their assertion that
collapsing the two probabilities into one is more efficient; indeed, this is
extremely doubtful. Assume, for the sake of argument, that there are three
possible causal explanations for how the injury occurred: A, B, and C. As-
sume further that there are three possible defendants who might have
caused the injury: X, Y, and Z. See the chart below. Under the so-called
two-step approach, there would be two separate issues: (1) which causal
explanation was most likely and (2) the identity of the proper defendant.
The drafters of the Restatement Third argue that these two issues can be
collapsed into one. The problem with this argument, however, is that, as-
suming these two probabilities are independent probabilities, by collapsing
the two probabilities into one, one must multiply the number of possible
146. See Jonathan Cohen's comments on this paradox that results from a mathematical probability
analysis. Id. at 58-61. See also Richard W. Wright, Possible Wrongs, supra note 39, at n. 155 & accom-
panying text, wherein the author correctly reasons that:
The issues addressed by the two conditions in the Restatement Second formulation... are dis-
tinct liability requirements. As with the distinct elements that make up a complete cause of
action, courts should and do require that they be individually appraised and proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. They are not subject to the combinatory algorithms of mathemat-
ical probability theory, which are valid for ex ante statistical probability assessments of what
might happen but not for ex post case-specific assessments of what actually happened.
Id.
147. COHEN, supra note 73, at 49-120; see also Wright, Bramble Bush, supra note 43, at 1049-66.
148. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 17 cmt. b.
149. Id.
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causal explanations by the number of possible defendants. Under the two-
step approach, the trier of fact could consider (1) how the injury occurred
and (2) the identity of the defendant as two separate probabilities with three
possible solutions for each issue:
Prob 1: How the Injury Occurred Prob 2: Identity of Defendant
Possible Answers: A B C Possible Answers: X Y Z
% of Likelihood: ? ? ? % of Likelihood: ? ? ?
Under the approach of the Restatement Third, however, where the two
issues are supposedly collapsed into one, the trier of fact would be forced
to consider nine possible causal explanations for (the still two-part issue of)
how the injury occurred and who caused it.
Single Probability: How the Injury Occurred and Who Caused It
PossibleAnswe AX AY AZ BX BY BZ CX CY CZAnswers:
When considering the approach of the Restatement Third in this light,
the contention that collapsing the two probabilities into one would be more
efficient seems dubious at best. Instead of simplifying the process for the
trier of fact, she would now have to consider nine separate possible causal
explanations for the injury. Although one might argue in response that the
two probabilities in the two-step approach might not be independent proba-
bilities such that, for example, X could only cause the injury by way of A
or B but not C, the fact remains that the number of possible solutions that
the trier of fact must consider under the approach of the Restatement Third
is still greatly increased when the two probabilities are collapsed into one.
Moreover, although the drafters of the Restatement Third suggest that they
have eliminated the needless second element (subsection (b)) found in the
formulation of res ipsa located in the Restatement Second, the drafters ul-
timately correctly note in accompanying comment d that the plaintiff may
be able to establish liability even when the one-step approach statistical
probability is not greater than 50 percent by introducing evidence "tending
to negate the presence of causes other than the defendant's negligence."
2010]
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The drafters of the Restatement Third also contend that the two-step
approach is inefficient because, under that approach, even if the trier of fact
knows that a sixty percent probability exists that the defendant did not
cause the injury (issue number two above), such that the second step cannot
be satisfied, the trier of fact must still inquire into other explanations of the
injury in order to determine whether the injury "ordinarily happens because
of negligence" (issue number one above). 150 In other words, the argument
is that the two-step inquiry must be performed one step at a time and in the
proper sequence; this, the drafters argue, is an inefficient use of time. 151
This argument is clearly erroneous, however. If the trier of fact knows that
one of the elements of a tort absolutely cannot be satisfied, then no further
inquiry as to whether the other elements have been satisfied is necessary.
Rather, the plaintiff has failed to prove her case. Period.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, the comments accompanying the Restatement Third's
formulation of res ipsa loquitur simply do not provide good reasons for the
significant changes that were made to the wording of the doctrine. Moreo-
ver, they demonstrate a confused understanding of the nature of proof and
fail to appreciate the consequences that would result if the Restatement
Third's formulation were literally applied.
Because of its ambiguous nature and unique role in the law of torts,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has confused courts in the past and will
likely continue to do so. As has been discussed herein, it is imperative that
res ipsa loquitur be phrased broadly enough to ensure that it continues to
serve the policy-driven purposes for which it exists. However, there is a
concomitant need that limiting instructions be phrased with the utmost care
in order to prevent res ipsa from being misused to impose liability on de-
fendants based upon nothing but naked statistics. The drafters of res ipsa in
the Restatement Third have clearly failed in this latter respect. Although
not perfect, res ipsa in the Restatement Second, on its face, effectively ba-
lanced the concern for injured plaintiffs with the requirement that some sort
of concrete, case-specific evidence point to the defendant. By doing so, it
enabled the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to accomplish the important role it
was intended to play in the law of torts. Instead of sticking with a formula-
150. Id. (stating that the inquiry as to whether something does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence is unnecessary when one already knows that the defendant "probably" did not cause the
injury, but arguing that the so-called two-step formulation is inefficient as it would require the trier of
fact to complete the former inquiry before beginning the latter).
151. Id.
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tion that worked, the drafters of the Restatement Third have created a ver-
sion of res ipsa that is unworkable, highly confusing, premised upon du-
bious assumptions, and will likely (and hopefully) gain little acceptance by
the courts.

